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I. The Proposal 
 
1. In coordination with the United States Israel would develop a plan for its 
unilateral withdrawal from all of the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank. 
In the West Bank the withdrawal would be largely to the green line with 
border adjustments to allow for 75% of the settlers to remain. Land within 
Israel would be designated for a 1 to 1 territorial swap for land retained. 
 
2. Israel would unilaterally undertake this withdrawal only if the United States 
was able to obtain a commitment from the international community (e.g. the 
United Nations Security Council) that once this withdrawal was made: 
 
a) These would become Israel’s permanent borders, fulfilling on 
the Palestinian front (except for the issues of Jerusalem and 
refugees) Israel’s obligations under UN Security Council 
Resolution 242. 
 
b) Within these borders, Israel would be recognized as a Jewish 
State. 
 
3.   Israel would commit, that following this withdrawal, if and when a Palestinian State 
emerged that exercised a monopoly of force within the territories, Israel would be 
prepared for mutual recognition between the two states and for negotiations of 
Jerusalem, refugees, security, economic cooperation and other end of conflict issues. 
 
Comment: Although this is a proposal for unilateral Israeli action, and does not depend upon 
any actions or agreement by the Palestinians, the proposal will generate  a process of 
dialogue between Israel and the international community, as well as with the Palestinians. It 
can be expected that before members of the Quartet or the Security Council will agree that 
the Israeli withdrawal ends the territorial dimension of the conflict, they will consult with 
both the  Arab states and the Palestinians. The United States will serve as a key player in this 




II. Public Support For This Proposal Within Israel 
 
In June 2004, the Steinmetz Center of Tel Aviv University, in conjunction with the 
University of Maryland, examined the degree of public support for this proposal. 
 
Among Israeli Jews a majority was found to support this proposal (54.4% favor, 29.6% 
oppose, 16.1% don’t know). This was an increase from April in which,  a clear plurality of 
support was found, (47.7% favor, 35.9% oppose, 16.4% don’t know). 
 
Respondents were asked: 
 
“ The government recently decided to unilaterally disengage from the Gaza Strip. What is 
your opinion of a similar unilateral disengagement from the West Bank under the following 
conditions: 
 
- The new border will approximate the Green Line with minor modifications so that Israeli 
sovereignty will include territories on which 75% of the Judea and Samaria settlers now live. 
 
- In return for territories annexed to Israel, The Palestinians will receive from Israel territories 
on the same scale. 
 
- This unilateral action will only take place if the United States is able to obtain from the 
UNSC recognition of Israel as a Jewish State within these permanent borders. 
 
- Negotiations over Jerusalem, Refugees and other issues will take place at later stage. 
 




Results were as follows: 
 
 Israeli Jews 
Strongly Support 23.5 
Support 30.9 
Oppose 10.4 
Strongly Oppose 19.2 




Analysis by party affiliation reveals that the proposal has surprisingly strong support across 
the political spectrum except for the far-right. Among Likud supporters (not just Party 
members) 45.6% supported and 37.4% opposed.  The breakdown was as follows: [April] 
 
 Support Oppose Don’t Know 
Likud 45.6% 37.4% 17% 
Shinui 56.1% 26.8% 17.1% 
Labor 69.8% 17.5% 12.7% 
Meretz 77.8% 11.1% 11.1% 
National Union 11.1% 77.8% 11.1% 
Shas 10.0% 75.0% 15.0% 
NRP 
 




III. Advantages of This Proposal Compared to The Limited (e.g. Gaza) Withdrawal of 
Prime Minister Sharon 
 
1. The Gaza withdrawal gives up land but gets nothing in exchange. This 
proposal will obtain two objectives from the international community: (a) 
recognition of the new border as the end of valid Palestinian territorial claims, 
(b) recognition of Israel as a Jewish State within the new boundary. 
 
 
2. The Gaza withdrawal will represent a victory for Hamas. This withdrawal, 
with international recognition of Israel as a Jewish State within fixed 
boundaries, will represent the most basic strategic failure of Hamas in its 
effort to eliminate Israel as a Jewish State. 
 
3. The Gaza withdrawal will unify Palestinians around the most violent 
elements, and serve to recruit young Palestinians to push Israel out of the 
West Bank. This proposal, by withdrawing from the West Bank, with 
territorial swaps that provide Palestinian with the equivalent of 100% of the 
West Bank, will divide Palestinians into the majority that is prepared to live 
at peace with Israel in a state of their own, and the extremist minority that 
seeks no accommodation with Israel. 
 
4. The Gaza withdrawal maintains Israel as an occupying power. In the face of 
continuing violence, Israel will not have the sympathy of the international 
community, and will remain limited in its ability to use its forces in self-
defense. This proposal, because it pulls Israel fully out of the West Bank and 
Gaza, and obtains international recognition of Israel’s permanent boundary, 
places the onus for further violence squarely on the Palestinians. Once Israel 
has withdrawn, a Palestinian state will emerge in the West Bank and Gaza, 
and Israel will be more fully able to influence it through the traditional means 
of state to state relations (e.g. deterrence and economic incentives). 
 
5.   The Gaza withdrawal will not change the nature of the separation fence in the West 
Bank. It will remain a source of tension with the Palestinians and of criticism from 
the international community. This proposal, by establishing a  recognized 
international border will involve a readjustment of the path of the separation fence so 
that it conforms with this border. Doing so, however, will transform the international 
reaction to the fence from hostility to acceptance.  
 
6.  The Gaza withdrawal as envisioned by Prime Minister Sharon represents a plan for 
Israel to hunker down behind barriers and wait.  On this proposal, with the territorial 
issue, except for Jerusalem, resolved, the structure will be in place for the central 
compromise that remains: Israeli concessions on Jerusalem in exchange for 
abandonment of the project of Palestinian return to Israel. 
 
 
IV. This Proposal in Comparison to a Fully Negotiated, Geneva-type Agreement. 
 
 
 If one assumes a) that it is possible to reach a comprehensive end of the conflict 
agreement with the Palestinians, b) that this can be attained within the near term, and c) that 
such an agreement will be faithfully implemented – then such a course of action is to be 
preferred above all others, including this proposal. 
 
 The case for comprehensive unilateral withdrawal rests on the conclusion that these 
three conditions do not presently exist, and are unlikely to exist any time soon: 
 
- Today, there is no pressure from any quarter for negotiations. Rather, 
there is at least verbal consensus on the Roadmap which imposed 
preconditions for negotiations. In particular, the precondition that the 
Palestinian Authority must dismantle the terrorist infrastructure is 
unlikely to be met. Thus movement towards negotiations is frozen. 
 
- The current Israeli government does not want comprehensive 
permanent status negotiations. And even if there were a different 
government in Israel, it is unclear that a negotiated solution to the 
conflict would be within reach. In particular, polling supports the 
view that agreement on the two issues of  Jerusalem and refugees will 
be extremely difficult to reach. Even with the best of intent, 
negotiations might only have a limited success, essentially on the 
issues of territory dealt with in the above proposal. 
 
- Given the general lack of interest on the part of the Israeli public in 
moving quickly to comprehensive permanent status negotiations, 
there is little likelihood that a political party that focuses on this 
approach will come to power in the near term. 
 
- Given the increased popularity of Hamas, and its refusal to view 
agreements reached with Israel as valid, a Palestinian state that comes 
into being through negotiations with Israel will face a continuing 
challenge to its legitimacy. This in turn will make implementation of 
a negotiated agreement particularly difficult, especially one in which 
the Palestinian make major concessions on refugees.   
 
This plan for comprehensive unilateral withdrawal seeks to a) resolve the central 
territorial issue, b) give rise to a Palestinian state and c) set the stage for future negotiations 
once a consolidated state has been achieved. It draws on the strong mood within Israel for 
unilateral action, yet implicitly engages the Palestinians on the key issue around which 
agreement can presently be reached: territory. 
 
 If this broad disengagement comes to pass, with Israel having left both the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank, it can be expected that the PLO will proclaim a Palestinian State. To gain 
international recognition this entity will have to demonstrate that it in fact has the key 
attribute of statehood: that it exercises a monopoly of power within a recognized territory. 
Under these circumstances it is likely that Hamas will accommodate itself to a necessary 
evolution into a political party, rather than use force to resist the state’s monopoly of power. 
This is made more likely by the fact that Palestinian statehood will have emerged unilaterally 
rather than through negotiations with Israel. Over the long run, it is this normalization of the 
Palestinian polity into the world of states that is most thoroughly in Israel’s security interests. 
Achieving this transformation is of more importance than a negotiated document within 
which a Palestinian partner makes commitments that it is unable or unwilling to carry out. 
Once Palestinian nationalism has moved from the phase of “liberation struggle” to a nation 
state with national interests to protect, Israel will find that it has many traditional tools 
ranging from economic incentives to military deterrence, with which to affect the behavior of 
the Palestinian state.  
 
V. MK Reshef Cheyne Proposal 
 
On October 1, 2004 the Boston Globe published an op-ed piece by Reshef Cheyne, MK from 
the Shinui Party. The article, entitled “A Plan to Fix Israel’s Borders,” proposes Israeli action 
along the lines of the above proposal -- a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from most of the West 
Bank provided that there is international recognition of that withdrawal as establishing 
Israel’s permanent boundary.  Reshef Cheyne is the Chairman of the Shinui Party faction.  
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